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1. Introduction
Social media is an increasingly pervasive and influential force in modern
civilisation. It is a key platform for communication in every aspect of life,
from personal to economic, political, to computing data analysis. In the field
of investing and data analysis, social media has become a popular venue for
individuals to share the results of their own analysis on financial securities
and provide a wealth of new data for exploration and exploitation (Pikulina
et al., 2017; Salhin et al., 2016).
Studies in the relatively recently developing field of behavioural finance
have presented empirical evidence that financial decisions are largely driven
by emotions and mood, and can be identified by social-media such as Google
Trends (Bijl et al., 2016; Gao et al., 2016), Facebook (Siganos et al., 2014)
and Twitter (Bollen et al., 2011; Kearney and Liu, 2014; Liu et al., 2015; Rao
and Srivastava, 2012). With the significant rise in sentiment studies, scoring
and measuring sentiment and in particular Twitter Sentiment Score (TSS)
has become a factor of importance.
With so much attention focused on the top executives in the Western
economy, a focus which was further amplified following the financial crisis
in 2008 (Kilpatrick, 2009), decisions related to CEO characteristics is vitally
important. It is therefore not surprising there are so many opinions, discus-
sions, news reports, and underlying sentiments about Chief Executive Officers
(CEOs) of some of the largest companies in the world, who verge on celebrity
and superstar status (Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Malmendier and Tate, 2009;
Wade, Porac, Pollock, and Graffin, 2006). Consequently, the mood (feelings
of happiness or anger) towards a newly selected CEO can be vented through
social media formats such as Twitter in today’s society. This has now been
shown on numerous occasions to have a significant impact on stocks: espe-
cially in the Associated Press Twitter hack in 2013, where “the false tweet
spotlighted the power of social-media in moving financial markets” (Lee and
James, 2007). Moreover, Gao et al. (2016) recently illustrated (Figure 1)
cumulative global sentiment from 2004, where it peaked in years such as
2007, and then nosedived in 2008 with the global financial crisis. With such
volatility in sentiment even on weekly basis, there is a gap in the literature
analysing per day for short-term events, specifically for CEO succession an-
nouncements. This study will explore this gap to complement the literature
through an analysis of the relationship between CEO successions and stock
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returns using Twitter as the source of sentiment.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Although the relationship between sentiment and stock returns is well
documented in numerous studies (Gao et al., 2016; Ranco et al., 2015) and
is evidenced by the increasing number of academic papers as seen in Figure
2, this study adds a new and original dimension to the UK and US CEO
announcement-based studies. According to Aguilera et al. (2006), the world
is divided into two main corporate governance systems: the Anglo-American
and the continental European-Japanese systems, and there is a lack of com-
parisons between the two systems. Therefore, our study further investigate
similarities and difference in stock returns during the event of a CEO succes-
sion announcement by using data from both the UK and US. Furthermore,
although classical finance theory suggests all information is incorporated in a
stock price immediately (Fama, 1965), previous studies have evidenced that
sentiment has an impact, questioning classical theory. Whilst there has been
significant progress in recent years on sentiment studies and social-media
(Bijl et al., 2016; Bollen et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2016; Kearney and Liu,
2014; Liu et al., 2015; Rao and Srivastava, 2012; Siganos et al., 2014), this
is the first study to combine sentiment analysis stock returns with corpo-
rate governance perspectives. For example, Feldman (2013) indicates that
Twitter sentiment is mostly used for marketing and production-based studies
but lacks finance-related studies. In addition, we examine aspects such as
gender (Allen et al., 1979; Lee and James, 2007), origin (Beatty and Zajac,
1987; Friedman and Singh, 1989; Grusky, 1963) against the aforementioned
Twitter Sentiment Score (TSS) to test their association with stock returns
predictive power and value (Liu et al., 2015).
[Insert Figure 2 here]
This paper aims to add to the literature as follows: First, this study seeks
to contribute to the extant corporate governance (CG) literature by exam-
ining the extent to which CEO succession announcements comply with and
disclose positive recommendations relating to their CG practices, and inves-
tigates whether sentiment associated with CEO succession announcements
can explain observable stock return differences. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this study atypically combines Twitter sentiment with the stock-market
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reaction of a new CEO successor announcement. Although the evidence is
well documented on CEOs succession topics such as executives leaving of-
fice (Gangloff et al., 2014); new leadership implications on firm performance
(Allen et al., 1979) and; differences in successors (Friedman and Singh, 1989;
Helmich and Brown, 1972; Lee and James, 2007; Shen and Cannella, 2003;
Wade et al., 2006); there is a much less dense body of research covering
the actual dates from press releases and news sources when companies make
the announcement. Therefore, this study presents new evidence from the
UK and the US, focusing specifically on the sentiment and announcement
date of a new CEO for 100 of the largest (ranked by OSIRIS) and listed
companies between 2010-2015, and their subsequent stock-market returns.
Second, this study employs a sentiment analysis on social-media in an origi-
nal way: generally, the reason for measuring CEO succession events is “the
market reacts to how well, compared to their predecessors, new CEOs are
suited to the demands of their roles, and to the potential for disruption in
organisational performance attending leadership transitions” (Friedman and
Singh, 1989, p.719). However, no previous studies have used the combina-
tion of sentiment analysis and event studies in the rich social media setting
of Twitter.
This study, therefore, presents finance-oriented research that heeded
calls from the literature to help fill these gaps, using the standard analyt-
ical technique of event-study and regression analysis, which has previously
found ambiguous results depending on the area/location/organisational type
studied (Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972), motivating this study of the UK
and the US. With approximately 10%-15% of companies in the United States
changing their CEO (Chung et al., 1987) each year, this type of event is a
frequent occurrence in the Anglo/American/Western corporate world, which
therefore in our opinion, has been greatly underinvestigated. For example,
Beatty and Zajac (1987) suggested future literature should test other types
of firms and time-periods, as well as, ”expanding the collection of perceptual
data to include performance estimates from groups other than stock-market
participants which are influenced by the decision to change top managers”
(Beatty and Zajac, 1987, p.315) - this study will therefore use the additional
perception of sentiment from Twitter. Thirdly, whilst the UK has began
publishing studies linking sentiment and stock returns (Siganos et al., 2014),
this current study is the first to use Twitter as a source of sentiment to offer
an original contribution on CEO succession announcements.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is a lit-
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erature review of studies that have considered the social media sentiment, in
particular on CEO succession and stock returns, which supports formulation
of the hypotheses. Section 3 provides details of the data and methodology.
Section 4 presents the models and empirical findings, and Section 5 con-
cludes the paper, stating the significance of the main findings and suggesting
avenues for future research.
2. Theory, Previous Empirical Literature and
Hypotheses Development
Casual perception suggests that the substance of tweets about the stock
trading system and market could be connected to investor psychology and
sociology. However, it is unclear whether financial related news media incites,
enlightens, or in essence purely mirrors financial investors’ interpretations
of stock market performance. Theoretically, there has been a long running
argument in the academic literature with respect to the success of the efficient
market hypothesis in explaining the predictability in asset returns. Classical
theory assumes financial markets are efficient; investors are rational, and that
they diversify their portfolios in order to optimize the statistical properties of
their investments. In line with this theory, regardless of the possibility that
some investors may be irrational, prices are brought back into equilibrium by
the actions of arbitrageurs (Antoniou et al., 2013; Baker and Wurgler, 2006;
Chen and Sherif, 2016). Accordingly, there is no role for investor irrationality
on asset pricing.
However, research in behavioural finance confirms that investor senti-
ment influences stock prices and mispricing is persistent due to costly and
non-productive profitable arbitrage (Lee et al., 1991). In contrast to the
suggestions of classical theory, modern behavioral finance theory suggests
that humans are in actual fact not rational machines; but rather they are
emotional, rationally limited, and subjective performers, who are affected
by things other than cold, hard facts (Bodie et al., 2011, p.356). Further-
more, behavioral theories posit that investors may frame erroneous stochastic
beliefs, either with excessive optimism or pessimism, and in this way inaccu-
rately evaluate asset values, causing asset prices to deviate from their intrinsic
values (De Long et al., 1990; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Lee et al., 1991). This
mispricing then becomes revised as the economic fundamentals are revealed
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and sentiment wanes and disappears. The pricing correction thus results in
a negative connection between investor sentiment and future stock returns.
Furthermore, theorists have long assumed that CEOs have heteroge-
neous talents and abilities that map onto firm performance. For example,
Rosen (1981), Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), Bertrand and Antoinette (2003)
and Adams (2005) find evidence that specific CEOs talents and abilities do
indeed matter. However, to date, neither theoretical nor empirical studies
have provided much guidance concerning which particular talents and abili-
ties are important for corporate governance and performance. According to
Allen et al. (1979), p179 “Although managerial succession has only a small
impact on organisational performance, different types of managerial succes-
sion generally produce significant, albeit slight, differences in organisational
performance”. In addition, Zald (1970) and Friedman and Singh (1989) argue
that certain CEO characteristics play a significant role in firm performance.
In this vein, Lee and James (2007) have examined the determinants of CEO
succession and found that external succession, CEO age and experience are
the factors that positively determine CEO succession and stock returns. Fur-
ther, Lieberson and O’Connor (1972) note that it is not possible to ascertain
how another leader would have performed at the same time. This implies
that markets react to new leadership very much depending on how specula-
tors feel about their characteristics (Lee and James, 2007).
The empirical literature on sentiment associated with CEO succession
announcement and stock returns is very thorough, but no prior studies have
used the combination of sentiment analysis using twitter and CEO succes-
sion events. Empirically, our study is related to two strands of literature: (i)
the impact of CEO succession announcements on firm performance and (ii)
social media twitter as a source of sentiment to CEO succession announce-
ment. With regard to (i), earlier studies have investigated the impact of
CEO succession announcement on firm performance. In this context, Guest
(1962) and Gouldner (1954) suggested a distinctive difference between how
organisations react to new managers who either represent the workforce’s
best interests, or are bureaucratic and punishment-oriented; with the former
having a more satisfied organisation. In another study, Allen et al. (1979)
found that succession always disrupts organisations through, for example,
workforce strikes. Later researchers have examined the relationship between
top managerial succession and organisational performance (Friedman and
Singh, 1989; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, and Gorman, 2005). For example,
Grusky (1963) suggested a ‘common sense theory’ for managerial succession,
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orientating around effective team performance - when poor, effectiveness has
a negative correlation with managerial succession. Similarly, other litera-
ture (Friedman and Singh, 1989; Salancik, 1980) suggests CEOs must be
fired to correct poor performance. Other studies (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake,
1986; Rowe et al., 2005) found evidence supporting both ‘ritual scapegoating
theory’ (succession does not impact performance) and ‘vicious-circle theory’
(succession worsens teams performance).
One further argument that has recently been given much attention is re-
lated to the impact of CEO succession announcement on stock returns. For
example, Lieberson and O’Connor (1972) and Weiner and Mahoney (1981)
found only an insignificant relationship between the information on the move-
ment of CEOs and stock returns. Similarly, Beatty and Zajac (1987) and
Chung et al. (1987) found a negative reaction to CEO succession announce-
ments. This implies that a new manager is disruptive to an organisation
(Friedman and Singh, 1989; Grusky, 1963). In contrast, Friedman and Singh
(1989) found a positive stock reaction to the announcement of CEOs in large
firms. This indicates that firms with poor performance have positive stock
reactions, while well-performing firms have negative stock-market reactions.
In addition, Chung et al. (1987) concluded that overall, new CEO’s, regard-
less of origin, do have an impact on stock returns due to a combination
of the momentum effect of good-firms-continuing-to-perform-well and vice-
versa (Grusky, 1963). In line with Friedman and Singh (1989) and Allen
et al. (1979), Reinganum (1985) demonstrates that higher succession fre-
quency is often associated with poor performance. However, Kudla (1980)
found no statistical differences in returns between firms who plan their future
strategies compared to those who do not.
With regard to origin and internal/external CEO characteristics, suc-
cessor origin is considered one of the most widely debated strands (Beatty
and Zajac, 1987; Friedman and Singh, 1989; Shen and Cannella, 2003). This
is, perhaps due to data transparency as it is generally clear where the CEO
had previously worked (Friedman and Singh, 1989). For insider and outsider
directors, (Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Shetty and Peery Jr, 1976) the literature
tends to reveal a distribution swayed towards insiders replacing CEOs 88%
of the time, yet finding that regardless of this, new CEO announcements
are usually met with a negative reaction on the stock market. For example,
Beatty and Zajac (1987) noted that for internal successors, day 1 and 2 had
negative returns, and day 3 was positive. In another study Shen and Can-
nella (2003) found strong positive stock market reactions for external hires,
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with negative reactions to insiders. Similarly, Chung et al. (1987) found
stock prices increase when better performing firms replace a CEO with an
outsider (4% abnormal return; 8.44% in the long-run), signaling company
confidence and hope (Allen et al., 1979; Grusky, 1963; Guest, 1962; Helmich
and Brown, 1972) as well as a deviation from poor current strategies (Chung
et al., 1987). Further illustrative of this, a study of 477 large corporations
saw the market react more favourably to better performing firms that were
taken over by an outside successor, when broadly, announcements are per-
ceived negatively (Lubatkin et al., 1989). In contrast, however, Reinganum
(1985) found smaller firms hiring outsiders reacted more positively. Other
studies (Friedman and Singh, 1989; Salancik, 1980) have found that compa-
nies are reluctant to hire an outsider as it is believed to show admittance of
failure internally. This implies that insiders receive a less positive response,
perhaps due to its signaling that current strategies are continuing, which pro-
vides no new distinctive prospects (Chung et al., 1987; Helmich and Brown,
1972). Countering this, however, is research which argues that insider ap-
pointments have the advantage of offering more inside-knowledge and have
considerable networks inside the firm to use social-resources more efficiently
(Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Chung, Rogers, Lubatkin, and Owers, 1987; Kot-
ter, 1982; Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers, and Owers, 1989; Shetty and Peery Jr,
1976).
Another consideration is CEO tenure and age. In agreement with Fried-
man and Singh (1989), Salancik (1980) found that the longer a CEO was
with a firm, the more negatively they were related to firm performance,
suggesting that a board should initiate succession to a CEO who would pro-
vide a beneficial shift to positive performance. This implies that the longer
tenure a CEO holds, the more homogenised an internal replacement would
be. A variable seldom examined with sentiment analysis is CEO age (Lee
and James, 2007). For example, some research (Serfling, 2014; Yim, 2013)
has found that older CEOs are less likely to take risks such as risky acqui-
sitions, which depending on the firm, may be suited to investors who may
reflect the firm’s risk-appetite. Similarly, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990)
found company performance is positively linked with CEO age, with a neg-
ative relationship discovered between CEO age and stock return volatility
(Serfling, 2014). In contrast, Eduardo and Poole (2016) found no relation-
ship of significance or even a general pattern for the age of the CEO having
any impact on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).
Regarding education and gender, King et al. (2016) examined the education-
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level (MBA) of CEOs in terms of its affecting bank performances, finding
that MBAs empower CEOs to deal with complex problems more efficiently.
Similarly, Bhagat et al. (2010) found that CEOs with stronger educational
backgrounds are related to positive and significant abnormal returns. How-
ever, this is in contrast with Gottesman (2006), who found that firms led by
CEOs who have an MBA perform no better than firms who do not. In
another study, Jalbert et al. (2002) found that CEOs with no academic
background have less academic credentials(not attend college) earn more.
While Lee and James (2007) found possible gender effects in CEO succession
alarmingly highlighted when a female CEO is announced, the reaction of
the stock-market is much more significantly negative. Indeed, Eduardo and
Poole (2016) found female CEOs are associated with a marginally significant
higher CAR than males. Also, Lee and James (2007) and Allen et al. (1979)
findings indicate that females hired internally are associated with a more pos-
itive reaction, compared to their external counterparts, who are more linked
to further deterioration in firm performance. Further, when females are in
general executive positions, they usually have no relationship with company
performance (Dezso¨ and Ross, 2008), although some findings suggest com-
panies led by a female CEO are associated with a higher ROA (Peni, 2014).
Generally, female CEOs are still relatively uncommon, so estimations are
based on smaller sample sizes, although they induce a greater circle of atten-
tion (Lee and James, 2007). According to Shetty and Peery Jr (1976), p.23,
“The chief executive officer (CEO) plays a crucial role in determining the
efficiency of an enterprise. . . his decisions, his power and his leadership have
vital consequences for the company as a whole”. Here, Shetty and Peery Jr
(1976) demonstrate how uncommon ‘her’ decisions, power, leadership was
only 4 decades ago; although they are slightly more frequent today (Lee and
James, 2007).
In terms of the effect of industry/company, Lieberson and O’Connor
(1972) found approximately two-thirds of the variance in sales and earnings
is company-specific and industry-dependent rather than related to the CEO.
Similarly, Salhin et al. (2016) found an industry difference with sentiment
analysis. In addition, Chung et al. (1987) argue that an external should
be considered if they have experience in the industry to provide expertise.
Indeed, Eduardo and Poole (2016) note a gap for future study is the number
of years of experience a CEO has in the same industry.
Another key area of literature is that related to Sentiment in Social
Media. Early research was based on an efficient market hypothesis that
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claims stock prices are driven by new information and therefore follow a
random path, as the occurrence of new information is random (Fama, 1965).
Later research has increasingly focused on the impact of investor sentiment
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Bodie et al., 2010; Boudoukh et al., 2012; Chen
et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 2001; Gangloff et al., 2014; Henry, 2008; Kearney
and Liu, 2014; Livnat and Petrovits, 2009; Oliveira et al., 2016; Rao and
Srivastava, 2012; Salhin et al., 2016; Tetlock, 2007; Yang et al., 2015).
Following on from this, more recent research has started to utilize in-
creasingly more available data from news articles (Tetlock, 2007), Twitter
(Bollen et al., 2011), Wikipedia (Preis et al., 2013) and Google Trends
(Bijl, Kringhaug, Molna´r, and Sandvik, 2016; Bollen, Mao, and Zeng, 2011;
Oliveira, Cortez, and Areal, 2016; Schniederjans, Cao, and Schniederjans,
2013; Siganos, Vagenas-Nanos, and Verwijmeren, 2014). For example, Kear-
ney and Liu (2014) indicated that social media platforms are considered
resourceful, as “many people spend a considerable amount of time every
day reading and writing internet postings about stocks” (p174). One of
the most pronounced events highlighting that social-media can influence the
stock-market was the Associated Press Hoax in 2013 on Twitter (Yang et al.,
2015), suggesting President Obama was injured, sending the Dow Jones index
spiraling by 143-points, demonstrating “how tightly intertwined Wall Street
has become with Twitter” (Yang et al., 2015, p.110). Similarly, Bijl et al.
(2016) found a negative sentiment reaction to stock returns and noted that
the most frequent topic searched by google is a price drop. In another study,
Gao et al. (2016) in agreement with Baker and Wurgler (2006), found an in-
verse relationship between sentiment and stock returns. In contrast, Siganos
et al. (2014) used Facebook, and found a significant positive relationship with
stock returns, implying counterintuitively that optimism would decrease the
stock price (De Long et al., 1990). However, Siganos et al. (2014) further
found a negative relationship between sentiment and volatility and trading
volume.
With regard to Twitter as another source of sentiment, Bollen et al.
(2011) found that public mood and sentiment on Twitter drive stock-market
prices, as Twitter can give a representation of the mood of the population.
In addition, Bollen et al. (2011) used mood as a factor of sentiment analysis,
finding that tweets can predict the stock-market with 86.7% accuracy, with
significant correlation with the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Instead of one
index, Liu et al. (2015) analysed co-movement between stocks and twitter
sentiment using the two indexes of the NYSE and the NASDAQ. They found
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that firms with an official Twitter account have a higher co-movement. In
another study, Rao and Srivastava (2012) investigated the relationship be-
tween short-term performance and sentiment. They found a high correlation
between stock returns and Twitter sentiment: “for short term trading deci-
sions, short term sentiments play a very important role in short term perfor-
mance of financial market instruments such as indexes, stocks and bonds”.
Similarly, Yu et al. (2013) examined the differences between Twitter and
conventional media and found that social-media has a much stronger link
with stock-markets than conventional media.
From the above analysis, we can conclude that “CEO succession an-
nouncements serve as signals to the investment community. However, it
is not the signal sent which is of primary importance, but the investment
community’s perception of the signal” (Beatty and Zajac, 1987, p.316). In
agreement with the most of the above-mentioned previous studies, it is conse-
quently hypothesised that there is a significant relationship between Twitter
Sentiment Score (TSS) and stock returns. Therefore, the first hypothesis is
identified as:
H1: There is an inverse relationship between sentiment and stock re-
turns.
The second hypothesis is related to which theory (common-sense, scape-
goat and vicious circle) is supported (Allen et al., 1979; Beatty and Zajac,
1987; Grusky, 1963). In line with much of the literature (Allen et al., 1979;
Chung et al., 1987; Friedman and Singh, 1989; Grusky, 1963; Lubatkin et al.,
1989) on firm performance, those who replace their CEOs are associated with
change of performance post-succession. Therefore, the second hypothesis is
identified as:
H2: How a firm performs in the year prior to the succession will have a
significant effect on stock returns when the new CEO is announced.
We study CEO characteristics and abilities and how those abilities re-
late to subsequent performance and stock returns. In addition, we note that
neither the theoretical nor empirical studies have to date provided much
guidance concerning which particular characteristics and abilities are impor-
tant for corporate governance and performance due to their mixed results.
Therefore, the next hypothesis is related to which characteristics or types are
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more important for corporate performance, identified as:
H3: There is a positive relationship between CEO individual character-
istics and subsequent CEO success.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data
The data adopted in this study includes daily data from a total of 60,000
observations over the five year period from January 1st 2010 to December
31st 2015 and is selected to specifically examine the impact of the sentiment
related to CEO succession announcement proposed by social media metrics.
For stock returns, we used a sample of firms that are listed on the indexes
of S&P100 and FTSE100 stock exchanges.1 We first retrieved the list of
the companies that are publicly traded on the two international markets
from the OSIRIS and DataStream databases, which were sorted by size in
order to analyse the largest companies. For data on CEOs in the UK and
US, we use the BoardEx database. In addition, Yahoo Finance was used to
source company stocks, and the indexes of S&P100 and FTSE100.2 Stock-
prices downloaded from Yahoo Finance were converted into returns following
Ranco et al. (2015), as shown in equation 1:
Stock Returns(R i,t) =
Pricet − Pricet−1
Pricet−1
(1)
We next constructed the Python code to extract the views of users in-
cluding the media, news, analysts, companies, or anybody who would like to
‘tweet’ (micro-blog in less than 140 characters). Approximately 17,000 tweets
were obtained and analysed for sentiment. We note that the Twitter API
has been commonly used in previous studies (e.g. Ranco et al. (2015)) but
that it has been criticised for being restricted by Twitter to sourcing tweets
generally in the last 8/9 days from the search date. Consequently, a bespoke
code, specifically for this study, was written to collect data from Twitter
1Most previous studies’ samples were smaller than ours (Yu, Duan, and Cao, 2013).
2Data is only obtained from companies with CEO changes. The list of companies is
available from the authors upon request.
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using the platform’s Python to search for the exact series of dates from the
day of the announcement and post three days. Overall, with 100 companies
each having their own unique code, Python was run over the course of 4
days to collect the tweets for each company. It collected a unique set of data
including the values of the number of followers, number of followings, and
number of tweets of each firm account at the parsing time. To generate the
number of firm-followers, information about the users followed by each firm
was also collected. The program began running on July 2, 2016. Because of
the large amount of data, the program ran for four days (crawling ceased on
July 5, 2016).
As databases currently provide no specific CEO succession announce-
ment date, a significant portion of time was consumed investigating this
through various sources such as company press releases, Google searches,
and news reports (e.g. Yahoo Finance, CBS, Bloomberg). Each date was
cross-referenced on Twitter search in order to ensure news agencies confirmed
the date of announcement.
Along with Python specifications, another coding platform, R, was used
to analyse the data. Selecting and acquiring a lexicon is one of the most im-
portant elements of sentiment analysis (Feldman, 2013). In line with other
researchers (Boudoukh, Feldman, Kogan, and Richardson, 2012; Kearney and
Liu, 2014; Oliveira, Cortez, and Areal, 2016), we use the finance-related lexi-
con from (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). This index was purposely created
to be used in finance and stock-market related sentiment studies (Loughran
and McDonald, 2011), which was obtained from the hyperlink in their study,
uploaded and coded into the R Studio software, where their value weight-
ing of finance-centric words have provided a more representative analysis of
sentiment. Following other researchers (Boudoukh, Feldman, Kogan, and
Richardson, 2012; Kearney and Liu, 2014; Rees and Twedt, 2012; Yu, Duan,
and Cao, 2013), our study commonly features the sum of positive words less
the sum of the negative words divided by a nominator of the overall number
of positive words less the number of negative words; as identified in equation
2. We construct our sentiment index by averaging the sentiment score of all
tweets for each individual company as:
Sentiment Score =
∑
POS −∑NEG
Number of POS - Number of NEG
(2)
The mean total Twitter Sentiment Score (TSS) for each company will
then be used as an independent variable to explain returns around new CEO
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announcements.
3.2. Methodology
In order to be consistent with earlier studies in this area, Brown and
Warner’s (1980) standard event study methodology was adopted to calculate
the abnormal returns. This methodology draws on the actual ex-post return
of the stock over the event window minus the normal return of the stock
over the event window. The normal return is defined as the return that
would be expected if the event did not take place. Following the approach of
other research (Henderson, 1990; Li, Shin, and Moore, 2006), the estimation
window used in this study is 200-days to 10-days prior to the announcement.
For each company i and event date d, the expected return is identified as:
Exp(Ri,t ) = αi + βi ∗Rmt +  (3)
where Exp(Ri,t ) is the expected return on a stock if the ‘event’ does not
occur; Rm is the return on the market (i.e. S&P100 or FTSE100); α is the
intercept between a stock and the market for the estimation period t−200 to
t−10; β is the slope of the regression; and  is the zero mean error term.
The abnormal returns over the 4-day event window are then identified as:
Ab(Ri,t ) = StockReturnsi,t−Exp(Ri,t ) (4)
Subsequently, the abnormal returns are aggregated over different periods
of the event-window, creating a set of CARs.3 Accordingly, CAR is identified
as in equation 5:
CARs = (1 + Ab0) ∗ (1 + Ab1) ∗ ... ∗ (1 + Abt) − 1 (5)
In order to examine the impact of Twitter Sentiment Score (TSS) associ-
ated with the announcement of CEO succession on stock return, the following
model is estimated, as in equation 6 and equation 7:
3This study calculates cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) immediately after (i.e. not
prior to) the report of succession (Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Gangloff, Connelly, and
Shook, 2014; Nofer and Hinz, 2015; Ranco, Aleksovski, Caldarelli, Grcar, and Mozetic,
2015).
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CARsi,t = α + βSenti,t + βLoci,t + βIndi,t + βYi,t + βSuci,t + βLagei,t+
βGeni,t + βOrigi,t + βDegi,t + βMBAi,t + βExpi,t +βTeni,t + βProfi,t
+βLSali,t + βLEmpi,t + 
(6)
where i denotes the firm number (1-100) and t is the time period (2010-2015);
Senti,t denotes the Sentiment Score; Loci,t is the location of the company
(UK or USA). Gen i,t is CEO gender. Orig refers to the successor origin;
Deg refers to the CEO successor first degree; MBA is the CEO successor
MBA degree; Exp is the CEO successor industry experience; Ten is the CEO
successor Tenure; Ten is the CEO successor Tenure; Prof, Sal and Emp refer
to firm profitability, sales and number of employees respectively.
Similarly, for the model without the industries and years as equation 7:
CARsi,t = α + βSenti,t + βLoci,t + βSuci,t + βLagei,t + βGeni,t+
βOrigi,t + βDegi,t + βMBAi,t + βExpi,t +βTeni,t + βProfi,t+
βLSali,t + βLEmpi,t + 
(7)
4. Empirical Findings
The empirical analysis begins with the descriptive statistics for the vari-
ables used in our tests. Tables 1 and 2 show CEO demographics and sum-
mary statistics, respectively. For the first cumulative abnormal return (0,1),
there was a negative (yet small) average (-0.02%) when a new CEO was an-
nounced. Sprint Corporation had the lowest CARs at (0,2) event window
(-22.742%). The highest CAR overall is associated with Serco Group Plc
(14.800% , (0,2)). While the sentiment score is positive on average at 0.102,
with the minimum company average being -0.435 (HCA Holdings Inc), and
the maximum average of the sentiment score being 0.583, associated with
Carnival Plc. Furthermore, the sentiment score is normally distributed, with
a slight negative skewness (-0.097). A mean of 0.5 was expected for the
Location, due to exactly 50 companies from each of the United States and
United Kingdom, being similar to the industry and year dummy variables.
A mean of 0.9 for succession indicates that 90% of the cases in the sample
are voluntary turnovers, which negatively skewed to the left, with leptokur-
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tic kurtosis (5.439).4 With a much smaller distribution between the log of
(CEO) age when they were appointed, the distribution is positively skewed
to the right (0.204), with platykurtic kurtosis (0.857). For gender, it is simi-
lar in pattern to succession, with 92% of the data sample being male CEOs
and only 8% female. The Origin has a mean of 0.680, indicating that 68% of
the new CEOs are internally recruited. This indeed implies a reduction over
approximately three decades (Lubatkin et al., 1989), and in line with other
literature (Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Friedman and Singh, 1989; Shetty and
Peery Jr, 1976) that found that outsiders accounted for roughly 12%-15%.
For education level, whilst 93% have a degree, only 35% of the new CEOs
hold a MBA, which is more common in the United States. Finally, our anal-
ysis shows that 61% of CEO successors have all of their experience in one
industry.
To analyse fairly and to make inferences, a number of checks were con-
ducted. Testing for autocorrelation revealed no issues and returned Durbin-
Watson scores of 2.239; 2.242; and 2.250 respectively. Values around 2 indi-
cate no serial correlation issues in any of these models (DeFusco et al., 2007).
In order to confirm there is no heteroscedasticity in the model, the residuals
are plotted against the CARs.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 2 presents a Pearson correlation matrix. The first dependent vari-
able of CARs (0,1) shows a significant (at the 1%-level) correlation with the
Sentiment Score (Pearson-coefficient of -0.261). In addition, there is a sig-
nificant positive correlation with Log of Age (at 5%-level of significance),
suggesting that the older the CEO is, the larger are the cumulative returns.
There are a few significant relationships. For example, location is positively
associated with Sentiment Score, suggesting that the sentiment Score is pos-
itively and significantly related at the 1%-level for the United States. The
Twitter Sentiment Score (TSS) is negatively related to the Automobile In-
dustry at the 5%-level; and has a positive relationship with the Log of Sales
of the announcement year. The Location suggests that the United States is
more positively associated (at the 1% level of significance) than the United
Kingdom to several variables such as internal CEO replacements. Interest-
ingly, the US is significantly (1%-level) more positive than the UK in both
4To save space, figure available from authors on request.
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the Log of Sales and Log of number of employees, which could explain the
significance of these variables in US literature. This finding is in agreement
with Rao and Srivastava (2012) who found highly correlated returns with
Twitter Sentiment Score (TSS).
[Insert Table 2 here]
Now we move on to test the impact of Twitter Sentiment associated with
CEO succession and stock returns, and do so through regression analysis.
Table 3 shows the empirical findings of OLS regression. As can be seen from
Table 3, and as hypothesised, the Twitter Sentiment Score (TSS) has an
inverse correlation (-4.978) with CARs when using event window (0,1) at the
5% significance level (P-value=0.012). This implies that the more positive
the Sentiment, the lower are the cumulative returns that are expected from
the market. For CARs (0,3), the Sentiment Score first becomes significant
only at the 10%-level, suggesting the relevance of the sentiment becomes less
important as the days go on from the initial reaction on the day of the event
to the day following it.
For CEO age, we found a positive and significant relationship between
age and stock returns (CARs) with different event windows for all three
models. This is consistent across industries and years, and implies that the
older a CEO is when she/he is announced, the larger the CARs will be on
the day of the announcement and the day following it. This indicates that
individual CEO characteristics do indeed have an impact on stock returns,
hence Hypothesis 3 is accepted. This is in line with the findings of previous
studies (Serfling, 2014; Yim, 2013), that found that as CEOs become older,
they are less likely to take risks, reducing the volatility of stock returns. Also,
this finding could possibly explain the CEO age and sentiment relationship.
If investors realise that ’larger firms’ are less volatile than ‘new stocks’ (Baker
and Wurgler, 2006), hence investing for stability and dividends, then older
CEOs are perhaps preferable and are better received than as they may be
more risk averse in some respects (Yim, 2013).
Next, how the findings are associated with firm performance is consid-
ered. Table 3 shows that the coefficient is marginally negative (-0.005) for
CARs (0,1). This implies that, conversely to the findings of Grusky (1963)
and Friedman and Singh (1989), there is in fact an inverse relationship if a
firm performs poorly the year prior to the announcement, as the returns will
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actually be higher. Therefore, these results align more naturally with the
ritual scapegoat theory (Gottesman, 2006), suggesting that the CEO can be
fired to reduce anxiety, and that there is no relation between performance
of the firm the year prior to the succession, and the performance as soon as
the new CEO is announced (proxied through CARs). Similarly, we found
a negative coefficient (-0.334) with Origin, but this was also insignificant.
This is in line with a number of previous studies (Allen, Panian, and Lotz,
1979; Grusky, 1963; Helmich and Brown, 1972; Shetty and Peery Jr, 1976)
and implies that external candidates are associated with a deterioration in
performance, and are not considered as effective as an internal replacement.
Indeed, hiring an outsider CEO suggested internal failure, the firm not be-
ing as effective at deploying social resources, or as being a disruptive move
(Friedman and Singh, 1989; Kotter, 1982; Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers, and
Owers, 1989; Salancik, 1980; Shetty and Peery Jr, 1976).
[Insert Table 3 here]
With regard to the type for succession (voluntary or forced), we found
an insignificant relationship between succession type and stock returns. This
implies that there are higher returns when succession is voluntary compared
to when it is forced. This is in line with the findings of Friedman and Singh
(1989), who found that the succession type had no significant effects on stock-
prices, consistent with most of the successions being a result of the voluntary
retirement of the predecessor.
In order to robustly check findings, and in line with a recent CEO Suc-
cession study (Brown and Caylor, 2009), we employed a Stepwise regression
method. In order for variables to remain in the Stepwise model (which adds
and removes variables on a per-model-basis), the significance of the variables
must be at least at the 10%-level for two tailed variables (Brown and Cay-
lor, 2009). Table 4 presents the estimations for three models/event windows
(0,1),(0,2), and (0,3). We estimate the models using the significant variables
obtained from the previous analysis (Twitter Sentiment Score (TSS), Log
of Age, Year 2013, and the Business Services Industry), as other variables
(gender, succession, origin, holding an MBA, experience in the one industry
and Tenure) fail to yield as significant parameters as our initial findings ro-
bustly yielded.5 We found further robust evidence supporting the relevance
and significance of the four variables highlighted in Table 4.
5See equation 6 for different variable explanations.
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[Insert Table 4 and Table 5 here]
5. Conclusion
This paper examined the effect of Internet information gathering regard-
ing CEO succession announcements on subsequent stock returns, in particu-
lar, Twitter Sentiment Score (TSS). We find that high levels of TSS predict
low future excess returns. The coefficients of the Sentiment Score variables
are statistically significant when a new CEO is announced, which is in line
with previous studies that have used sentiment analysis on other commu-
nications such as earnings announcements. We also find evidence that the
predictive power of TSS is similar across industries. Importantly, TSS is
particularly influential in short windows as it loses significance with each
progressive day. In addition, our analysis shows that the age of the CEO
when they are announced, and the year of announcement, are consistently
positive and significant at the 1% level of significance, implying that the older
a CEO is, the higher the stock returns. In terms of specific industries, we
found that the CEO succession-sentiment is dominated by Business Services
sector grouping as there is a positive relationship between the announcement
of the CEO in this industry and stock returns. Other factors (gender, CEO
origin, succession type, CEO tenure, education, location, and firm perfor-
mance) fail to yield economically plausible predictive values. Table 5 shows
the summary of our empirical findings. One practical implication of our re-
sults is that scope by mass media can play a role in reducing data issues and
problems regardless of the possibility that it does not break real news. This
has the further implication that companies-media relations activities can in-
fluence their cost of capital. Recently, regulatory changes in the securities
industry have left many firms without expert scope and analyst coverage.
Our findings recommend that the media (and firms’ media relations offices)
may offer a substitute or a supplement to classical channels of corporate
information such as analyst coverage.
The findings of this study offer insights for investors, institutions and
policy makers interested in sentiment tracking tools, in which individuals
evaluate the extent to which they experience positive and negative affect,
happiness, or satisfaction with life. Public mood analysis from Twitter feeds
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on CEO successions in particular offers an automatic, fast, free and large-
scale addition to this toolkit that may in addition be optimized to measure
a variety of dimensions of the public mood state. Furthermore, our findings
are critical for regulators. Cynics may argue that companies misuse social
media by disseminating misleading and speculative information to investors,
and thus call for regulating social media. However, our results demonstrate
the inverse; the information in social media may help investors and compa-
nies in their investment-decision-making. Our findings also have important
implications for the role social media plays in the contributing community,
the individuals and companies use social media to share information with
respect to companies’ future prospects of their mutual benefits.
Our analysis does not acknowledge a number of important factors that
should, however, be examined in future research. First, we note that our
analysis is not designed to be limited to any particular geographical location
or subset of the world’s population. This approach is appropriate since the
US stock markets are affected, and do in fact affect, individuals worldwide.
However, for the particular period under observation, Twitter users were de
facto predominantly English speaking and located in the US and the UK. As
Twitter’s user base becomes increasingly international and the use of smart-
phones equipped with geo-location increases, future analysis could factor in
location and language to avoid geographical and cultural sampling errors.
Second, future research may need to take into account social and cognitive
effects in which individual agents are endowed with the ability to learn from
past experiences and can adjust their trading behavior accordingly. The in-
vestigation of such phenomena in online social networking environments is
part of an exciting new research front commonly referred to as “computa-
tional social science”. Subsequently, future research may consider the direct
assessment of public mood states against those derived from online commu-
nities of Twitter, to include metadata, for example, the number of followers,
enables weighting of content producers in view of their impact and reach.
Finally, future research should investigate the intraday level, as Tweets are
recorded with a granularity of one moment. Intraday level investigation could
uncover how rapidly the market responds to Tweets, considering possibly ex-
ceptionally detailed examinations of the connections between Twitter, CEO
declaration and stock returns.
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Table 1
CEO Demographics
Gender Percentage
Male 92%
Female 8%
Age at Announcement Percentage
Less than 45 6%
Between 45 - 52 39%
Between 53 - 60 50%
Greater than 60 5%
CEO Origin Percentage
Internal 68%
External 32%
MBA Percentage
Hold an MBA 35%
No MBA 65%
Experience Percentage
In Only One Industry 61%
In More Than One Industry 39%
Tenure with Firm Prior to Announcement Percentage
External Successor (0 years) 29%
Between 1 - 5 years 13%
Between 6 - 15 years 23%
Between 16 - 30 years 26%
Greater than 30 years 9%
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
CARs (0,1) -0.023 3.65 1
Sentiment Score 0.10 0.23 -0.261** 1
Succession 0.90 0.30 0.064 0.035 1
Log Age 3.96 0.10 0.249* 0.057 -0.125 1
Gender 0.92 0.27 0.031 0.051 0.025 -0.017 1
Origin 0.68 0.47 0.008 -0.044 0.057 0.107 -0.044 1
Uni U/Grad Deg 0.93 0.26 -0.071 -0.007 0.039 0.127 -0.081 -0.020 1
MBA 0.35 0.48 0.061 -0.033 0.035 0.021 -0.170 -0.261** 0.201* 1
Experience in One Industry 0.61 0.49 0.109 0.029 -0.130 0.153 0.142 0.111 0.102 -0.058 1
Tenure 11.92 11.73 0.058 0.049 0.089 0.232* -0.056 0.621** -0.012 -0.176 0.309** 1
Profit Margin of Yr Prior to Anncnt 11.01 10.74 -.020 0.101 -0.036 -0.043 0.106 0.187 -0.003 0.085 0.052 0.145 1
Log Sales of Anncnt Yr 17.07 1.26 -0.014 0.214* -0.143 0.283** -0.013 0.404** 0.187 -0.084 0.326** 0.497** -0.061 1
Log No. Employees of Anncnt Yr 10.98 1.33 0.041 0.052 -0.132 0.179 -0.175 0.237* 0.085 -0.074 0.137 0.383** -0.015 0.601** 1
**significant at the 0.01 level, *significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 3
OLS Estimations for all full Variables
Variables CARs (0,1) CARs (0,2) CARs (0,3)
Constant -46.232 -68.900 -77.156
Sentiment Score -4.978** -5.554** -4.678*
Location -0.469 -0.752 -1.650
IndTechnology 0.256 .469 1.016
IndPharmaceutical 0.159 0.366 1.007
IndAutomobile 0.979 2.008 2.349
IndAerospaceDef -0.420 -0.581 -0.602
IndOilGas 1.179 1.174 2.128
IndBanking -1.173 -1.854 -1.492
IndInsurance 3.281 2.396 2.829
IndFoodBeverage 2.022 3.049 3.984
IndLogistics -2.425 -3.162 -3.329
IndAirline 2.147 5.111 6.766*
IndCommunications 0.868 1.612 3.367
IndAgriculture 2.763 4.075 6.199
IndConstructionMining 1.214 2.205 1.238
IndEnergy 1.696 1.462 2.267
IndBusinessServices 4.563* 7.007** 7.585**
Year2011 0.111 0.425 1.483
Year2012 0.121 1.134 2.785
Year2013 -2.401* -2.098 -1.170
Year2014 0.632 1.622 2.699
Year2015 -0.463 0.076 1.341
Succession 0.557 0.996 1.192
Log Age at Anncnt 10.638** 14.591** 16.349***
Gender 0.762 0.853 1.150
Origin -0.334 -0.429 0.023
Uni U/Grad Deg -1.870 -1.543 -1.924
MBA 0.605 0.745 1.083
Exp in 1 Ind 0.962 1.615 1.749
Tenure 0.049 0.046 0.055
Profits of Yr Prior to Anncnt -0.005 -0.020 -0.048
Log Sales of Anncnt Yr 0.014 0.420 0.130
Log No. Employees of Anncnt Yr 0.328 0.193 0.614
F 1.058 1.008 1.152
Durbin Watson 2.239 2.242 2.250
R2 0.346 0.335 0.366
***significant at the 0.01 level **significant at the 0.05 level *significant at
the 0.10 level. See equations 2 and 6 for details about variable explanations.
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Table 4
OLS Estimations and Stepwise Method
Variables CARs (0,1) CARs (0,2) CARs (0,3)
Constant -39.675 -55.315 -54.961
Sentiment Score -5.125*** -5.156*** -4.736**
Year2013 -2.159***
Year2014 2.215** 2.363**
IndustryBusinessServices 3.514**
Log Age at Anncnt 10.24*** 14.01*** 13.87***
F 6.758*** 6.605*** 6.118***
R2 0.222 0.171 0.160
***significant at the 0.01 level **significant at the 0.05 level *significant at
the 0.10 level. See equation 2 and 6 for details about variable explanations.
Table 5
Summary of Empirical Findings
Variable Significant Insignificant
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Sentiment Score X
Succession X
Log Age at Anncnt X
Gender X
Origin X
Uni Degree X
MBA X
Exp in 1 Ind X
Tenure X
Profits of Yr Prior to Anncnt Yr X
Log Sales of Anncnt Yr X
Log No. Employees of Anncnt Yr X
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Figure 1: Cumulative Global Sentiment (Gao et al, 2016)
Figure 2: Number of Papers on Google Scholar with Hits for “Sen-
timent Finance Returns” (1990-2015)
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